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CAN PUBLIC DEBT ENHANCE DEMOCRACY?
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE*

ABSTRACT

This Essay draws on historicaland current examples to examine
the extent to which public creditors can enhance democracy by
monitoring public officials in a manner that compensates for the
failures of the government debtor's constituents to monitor public
officials. Creditors and constituents may share significantinterests,
depending on the structure of security arrangementsfor public debt
and the identity of the debtors. Where interestsoverlap, the capacity
of creditors to overcome collective action problems suffered by constituents may transform creditors into surrogates for constituents.
Whether creditorsare willing to play this role, however, may depend
on the existence of alternatives to creditor monitoring, such as
diversificationand market constraints on default. The Essay concludes with an examination of the plausible scope of creditor
monitoringin contemporarysettings of sovereign and state and local
debt.

* Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, NYU School of Law. An earlier version
of this Essay was presented as the annual George Wythe Lecture at the College of William
and Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law in April 2008. Thanks to Alyssa Bell for substantial
research support and to Kevin Davis and Katharina Pistor for conversations and comments.
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INTRODUCTION

In the early fifteenth century, the Republic of Genoa was
teetering on the brink of financial disaster. Plague, war, and
internal dissent had increased Genoa's debt to the point that 90
percent of the Republic's ordinary income was required to service
interest obligations.' Creditors of the Republic recognized the
situation as unsustainable, and acted to protect their interests from
what must have seemed like imminent bankruptcy.2 In 1407, they
founded the Casa di San Giorgio ("San Giorgio"), an institution that
was nominally a private association, but the function of which was
to bring order to the Republic's finances and reduce the risk of debt
repudiation.' San Giorgio began its operations by exchanging
Genoa's massive debt for equity shares in the new association.4 San
Giorgio then made "grants" to fund the Republic's governmental
activities. In return, San Giorgio received the right to collect taxes,
to operate the Republic's profitable salt monopoly and mint, and to
govern some of the Republic's overseas territories.5 Thus, although
San Giorgio's 11,000 shareholders, governed by a corporate
structure that involved several councils and an eight-person board
of directors called 'The Protectors of San Giorgio," were nominally
equity holders, they were effectively lenders secured by payments
from dedicated revenue streams of the Republic.6
San Giorgio was, in some ways, a beneficent creditor. It
distributed large sums to Genoan charities,7 forgave many of the
Republic's debts during times of excusable fiscal distress, and

1. STEVEN A. EPSTEIN, GENOA AND THE GENOESE, 958-1528, at 229 (1996).

2. See id.
3. See id.; Michele Fratianni, Government Debt, Reputation, and Creditors'Predictions:
The Tale of San Giorgio, 10 REV. FIN. 487, 487 (2006).
4. See id.
5. See JAMES MACDONALD, A FREE NATION DEEP IN DEBT: THE FINANCIAL ROOTS OF

DEMOCRACY 95 (2003).
6. Id. at 95-96.
7. See Fratianni, supra note 3, at 496. As I hope to indicate below, the capacity to
distinguish between excusable fiscal distress and inexcusable strategic nonpayment by the
debtor is a hallmark of the monitoring capacity of creditors. The fact that San Giorgio
shareholders made this distinction indicates their capacity to monitor the conduct of the state.
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dedicated substantial contributions to the operation of the state. 8
This beneficence may have been motivated largely by the selfinterest of the shareholders, who also tended to be residents of
Genoa.' Thus, imposing unduly harsh conditions on the Republic
would mean imposing such conditions on themselves. ° But most
importantly, San Giorgio regularized access to credit, attracted
shareholders by reducing the risk of default, and-by assuring
repayment of loans-brought political stability to a state that had
previously so abused the financial wherewithal of its constituents"
through policies such as forced loans that, in 1339, the enraged
constituents burned the Republic's tax and debt records in a popular
revolt. 2 Machiavelli so highly regarded the subsequent effect of San
Giorgio on the finances and governance of Genoa that he referred to
the association as "the preserver of the country and the Republic." 3
It would be inappropriate, however, to think of San Giorgio as a
crucible of democracy. Although a "state within a state,"'4 San
Giorgio was primarily interested in protecting creditors' rights and
reversing Genoa's reputation for debt repudiation.'" In doing so, San
Giorgio arguably enriched its own shareholders by transforming the
Republic into a mere pensioner and shifting the obligation to
support the state from the merchant beneficiaries of the state's
commercial ventures to the general public. 6 Moreover, San Giorgio
enforced its contractual rights in ways that might be seen as
inconsistent with democratic values. San Giorgio had the right not
only to prosecute tax evaders, but to torture them, excommunicate
them, and sentence them to death. 7 There is, however, no indication
of the use of waterboarding.

8. Id.
9. See MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 142 (concluding that "the eleven thousand
shareholders of San Giorgio represented the large majority of households in the city").
10. See Fratianni, supra note 3, at 488.
11. I use "constituents" throughout to refer to a group broader than the electorate, which
may be limited by voting qualifications.
12. MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 80-81.
13. Id. at 96 (quoting Machiavelli).
14. Fratianni, supra note 3, at 495.
15. Id. at 487.
16. See id. at 495.
17. See MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 95.
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Even if San Giorgio was undemocratic, its role in creating more
widespread wealth, diluting the authority of the few autocratic
families that had theretofore ruled Genoa, and constraining the
exercise of political power by controlling financial affairs suggests
that its policies greatly facilitated the growth of democratic values."8
San Giorgio certainly did not intend the fomentation of democracy
to be one of its objectives, but governance through structures more
likely to align the interests of officials and constituents may have
been an inevitable byproduct of its activities. It was not simply that
San Giorgio involved a complicated governance structure-a
General Assembly of 480 shareholders and an elected protectorate
of 8 members with financial expertise' 9 -that reduced concentrations of power by giving rise to a large pool of prospective public
officials. It was also the case that the control that creditors exercised over the Republic's access to credit constrained those who
sought political control over Genoa from attaining power through
the abuse of constituents' rights.2 °
San Giorgio, then, stands as an exemplar of an interesting but
underanalyzed phenomenon of public finance. It has become
commonplace to suggest that the institutions that support public
credit simultaneously create incentives for democratic governance
within constitutional constraints. 2 ' According to this theory, public
18. Id. at 96. Macdonald explains that San Giorgio effectively displaced political feuds by
omitting the parties who placed power politics ahead of financial security:
The Genoese, unable to form a cohesive polity on the basis of one-man-one-vote,
had effectively formed [through San Giorgio] a parallel polity based on
formalized power-sharing that largely excluded the two most disruptive
elements in city life: the ex-feudal aristocracy and the urban poor. The Fieschi
and Grimaldi families, so dangerous politically, were almost unrepresented in
its administration, whereas the urban mercantile nobility, such as the Spinola
family, featured prominently.

Id.
19. Fratianni, supra note 3, at 493-94 (reporting that the election was not fully
democratic, in that persons eligible for election were limited to a subset of citizens listed in
a secret book that was updated annually). Indeed, it is not clear that even this level of
democratic election was always available. Cf. MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 96 (noting that
"protectors" were appointed, and they, in turn, appointed their successors at the end of their
term.).
20. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS
FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 250 (2006).
21. See, e.g., MICHAEL SONENSCHER, BEFORE THE DELUGE: PUBLIC DEBT, INEQUALITY, AND
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 3-8 (2007).
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creditors will condition their loans on the sovereign's creation or
toleration of institutions that increase the probability of payment
by constraining the capacity of the debtor either to use loaned
funds for unanticipated objectives (the moral hazard problem) or
to repudiate or unilaterally alter the repayment obligation.22
Frequently, these institutions take the form of representative
bodies-at least representative of creditors-that are able to control
tax collection and sovereign expenditures. 23 Through these footholds
in the political process, creditors arguably set in motion the forces
that have emerged into full political participation in advanced
democracies. Moreover, commentators now perceive these institutions as precursors to rapid commercialization, economic growth,
and the general enforcement of contract and property rights. In
short, the presence of public debt is seen as a catalyst for democracy
and robust markets rather than simply a means of financing the
self-interested objectives of political officials.2 4
In this Essay, I explore an additional mechanism that identifies
public credit with democratic governance. I suggest that, notwithstanding some inevitable divergence between the interests of
governmental creditors and debtors, public debt can enhance the
representative nature of democratic governance to the extent that
creditors engage in monitoring that transforms them into surrogates
or virtual representatives for the debtor's constituents. To be
specific, creditors may have the capacity to monitor government
officials in a manner that both complements and improves the
institutions that constituents at large utilize to constrain public
officials. Indeed, creditors' incentives allow them to overcome
collective action problems that frustrate constituent monitoring of
their officials. It was just this form of monitoring that presumably
allowed the members of San Giorgio to distinguish between
threatened defaults generated by benign conditions and those that
arose from opportunistic behavior of public officials.25 Ostensibly,
the creditors were willing to waive the former, but not the latter.
22. See, e.g., Fratianni, supra note 3, at 494-96.
23. See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 95 (referring to San Giorgio as an example of
such a body).
24. See SONENSCHER, supra note 21, at 3 & n.7.
25. See Fratianni, supra note 3, at 488-89, 496.
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Any such strategy, however, required that creditors actively2 monitor
6
officials to determine the source of the threatened default.
On reflection, the claim that creditor monitoring can enhance
democracy should not be surprising. The capacity of creditors to
constrain the activities of officials in private firms is the subject of
a vast literature.2 7 Creditors of firms presumably have interests
that, to some extent, coincide with those of shareholders, insofar
as profit-maximizing activities increase both the capacity of debtors
to repay debts and the value of shares. Thus, although creditors
provide financial advice to debtors or monitor fiscal behavior to
constrain the firm's officers from misusing corporate assets in a
manner that would threaten repayment,2 8 they simultaneously
confer a benefit on shareholders who lack either the capacity or the
willingness to engage in similar monitoring. My objective here is to
explore the extent to which a similar relationship exists between
creditors of government and the constituents of government debtors.
My reference to democracy in this Essay is somewhat idiosyncratic. It does not necessarily entail direct participation by constituents in political processes. Instead, it entails any political system in
which officials face significant institutional constraints to comport
themselves in a manner that is consistent with the interests of their
constituents. Typically, those constraints come from the constituents themselves in their role as voters, or from designated third
parties, such as courts, that are charged with enforcement of
constitutionally dictated restrictions on governmental authority.
Thus, my use of the term "democracy" necessarily embraces the
concept of virtual representation by proxies who are not elected or
accountable to constituents, but who, by virtue of sharing the
constituents' interests, serve to advance their preferences, which
public officials might otherwise ignore.
The alignment of interests between creditors and constituents is
important because constituents-even when acting as voters-face
numerous obstacles to serving as effective monitors of their officials.
26. See id. at 496.
27. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of CorporateGovernance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 757 (1997) (describing some of the existing literature).
28. See Frances E. Freund, Lender Liability:A Survey of Common Law Theories, 42 VAND.
L. REv. 855, 886 (1989).
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Thus, the claim that public creditors can enhance democracy
assumes that creditors can overcome the limitations on monitoring
by noncreditor constituents. It is plausible, of course, that public
creditors could serve as effective monitors of officials, but still not
serve as an effective substitute for the electorate. This would be the
case, for instance, if public creditors are monitoring for behavior
that varies from the behavior that concerns the electorate, or if the
time horizon of creditors varies from the time horizon of the
electorate. Thus, the claim that creditors enhance democracy also
assumes that within the range that creditors can monitor and
noncreditor constituents cannot, the interests of creditors, and thus
the conditions for which they would monitor, coincide with the
interests of noncreditor constituents.
I. THE IDENTITY OF CREDITOR AND CONSTITUENT INTERESTS
The possibility that public debt could actually benefit democratic
governance is by no means self-evident. Indeed, public debt is
frequently considered antithetical to good government.29 After all,
capital to which credible commitment provides easy access can be
used for bad reasons as well as good. Much of the early history of
public debt, particularly that incurred by hereditary monarchs, is
written in the blood of destructive wars financed by foreign capital,
the corruption of officials by financiers who advanced sums in
return for a subsequently abused right of tax collection, and the
reduced productivity created by the use of capital for forced loans
rather than for the infrastructure and public goods that one might
imagine constituents would have preferred."a Because political
officials have the capacity to raise taxes, they suffer fewer constraints than officials of firms for whom debt may serve as a bond
to pay future cash flows to shareholder recipients of the debt.3 1
The San Giorgio experience illustrates how financial arrangements that mollify creditors are not necessarily embraced by those
29. See, e.g., SONENSCHER, supra note 21, at 3.
30. See, e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 138-44; DAvID STASAVAGE, PUBLIC DEBT AND
THE BIRTH OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE: FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1688-1789, at 52-53
(2003).

31. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 324 (1986).

20081

CAN PUBLIC DEBT ENHANCE DEMOCRACY?4

945

who must pay the debt service, even when capital is put to good use.
Governments could favor use of limited funds to repay creditors over
use of the same funds to fulfill political and social obligations to
constituents.3 2 The common practice in late and post-medieval
England and Europe of granting creditors the right to collect debts
directly, rather than to receive payments funneled through the
debtor's treasury, suggests distrust of governmental willingness
both to collect sufficient revenues from constituents and to pay
creditors those funds that were collected. The fact that creditors
were from a small, propertied class of nobles and merchants, 4 or
worse yet, foreigners who feared debt repudiation more than they
feared the hostility of taxpayers,3 5 exacerbated the divergent
interests between creditors and constituents.
Moreover, there are conditions under which creditors will fail to
monitor, so that the mere extension of credit, for good reasons or
bad, reveals little reason to believe that creditors and constituents
share interests that would make the former group a useful proxy for
the latter. Monitoring may be futile where sovereigns suffer little
compunction about default or debt repudiation. France, for instance,
witnessed five defaults between the mid-sixteenth and midseventeenth centuries.3 6 Subsequent monarchs avoided repudiation,
but unilaterally reduced contracted-for interest rates.3 7 Spanish
debt was "restructured," after defaults on at least eight occasions
between 1557 and 1662.38 Indeed, monitoring becomes superfluous
to the extent that there is no effective way to enforce payments by
sovereigns who wish to default, a phenomenon that resurfaced in
the 1920s when sovereign borrowers as diverse as Russia, Mexico,

32. See SONENSCHER, supra note 21, at 11.
33. See, e.g., STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 60 (noting that English kings "often secured
loans by giving their creditors the right to directly collect certain Crown revenues').
34. Id. at 135 tbl.6.1 (reporting that in France, nobles and merchants made 77 percent of
the loans to the State from 1682 to 1700, and 81 percent of the loans from 1730 to 1788).
35. Id. at 135 tbl.6.2 (reporting that in France, foreign creditors made 12 percent of loans
to the State from 1730 to 1749, and 18 percent of the loans from 1770 to 1789).
36. See MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 143 (noting that there were "five major bankthe last four of which were accompanied by massive repudiations of debt").
ruptcies ...
37. See STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 89.
38. MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 129-30.
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and Turkey defaulted notwithstanding the apparent absence of
any fiscal distress that warranted nonpayment.3 9
The ineffectiveness of monitoring is, of course, a relative matter.
Creditors will still be willing to extend credit to risky debtors if
there exists a reasonable substitute for monitoring. Traditionally,
creditors have demanded risk premiums in the form of higher
interest rates from sovereigns whose history indicated a higher
likelihood of default to compensate for the higher risk of nonpayment.4 ° Although this tactic has been economically rational for
creditors, it necessarily imposes a more significant financial burden
on the debtors' constituents. After French sovereigns in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries defaulted on outstanding debts and unilaterally reduced interest rates, subsequent
French sovereign borrowing occurred only at interest rates signifi41
cantly higher than those charged for English sovereign borrowing,
a fact that ostensibly contributed to the fiscal crises underlying the
French Revolution. 42 Alternatively, potential creditors may refuse
to extend credit at all to sovereigns that have reneged on existing
debts without justification. 43 Assuming that the sovereign has the
need for capital infusions and would use the proceeds to advance
constituent interests, one can hardly consider creditor refusals to
lend based on the defaults of former governments to be evidence of
unity of interests with constituents.
These concerns about public credit found voice in David Hume's
reaction to the vast debts incurred by England to fight the Seven
Years War. In floating the prospect of the state's declaration of
voluntary bankruptcy, Hume famously wrote "[E]ither the nation
must destroy public credit or public credit will destroy the nation."4
Hume's objections, however, were not simply economic. Instead,
they were based largely on the political implications of debt. In
particular, his concerns implied a necessary contradiction between
39. MICHAEL TOMz, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT

ACROSS THREE CENTURIES 86-87 (2007).
40. See STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 89.

41. See id. at 69.
42. See id. at 95.
43. See TOMZ, supra note 39, at 86-89.
44. DAVID HUME, ON PUBLIC CREDIT (1752), reprinted in HUME: POLITICAL ESSAYS 166,
174 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1994).
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public debt and the conditions for democracy. 45 Public debt exacerbated divergent interests within the nation, insofar as it facilitated
concentration of capital among an urban merchant class that was
supported by taxation on the "provinces."4 Debt inflated prices and
taxes; it placed too much authority in the hands of foreign creditors
whose allegiance was inconsistent with the interests of Englishmen;
and, in a reminder of the biblical admonition to live by the sweat of
our labor,47 it would encourage a "useless and unactive life" by
allowing creditors to live idly off the interest of their investments.4 8
The state's voluntary declaration of bankruptcy might sacrifice the
welfare of the thousands of people who held state obligations, but
the alternative was to sacrifice millions "for ever to the temporary
safety of thousands. ' 49 That would be the case if servicing debt were
to consume so much of the sovereign's assets as to render the state
defenseless against its enemies. The sovereign debt would be
extinguished, but it would be a "violent death," as compared with
the "natural death" of bankruptcy."
More recent literature is kinder to the relationship between
public debt and democratic governance.5 1 In the most obvious
connection, creditors who impose strict requirements on debtors
that increase the probability of payment necessarily constrain the
use of cash and reduce borrowing costs for the debtor's constituents.
San Giorgio's tough tactics for debt collection revealed that relationship: long-term interest rates in Genoa were lower than those in
virtually every other European financial center.5
More to the point, however, the terms that creditors demand from
sovereign debtors induce the creation of democratic institutions."
Those requirements result from the puzzle of public debt: although
its extension could make a government economically secure enough
to collect revenues necessary for repayment, any sovereign suffi45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 169-70.
See id.
See Genesis 3:19 ("In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.').
HUME, supra note 44, at 170.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176.
See, e.g., SONENSCHER, supra note 21, at 3 n.7.
Fratianni, supra note 3, at 502.
See, e.g., SONENSCHER, supra note 21, at 3 n.7.
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ciently powerful to enforce a regime of taxation necessary to service
its debt might also be secure enough to repudiate its obligations;
any government with the resources necessary to attract public credit
could also have the capability of defaulting with relative impunity.
Thus, creditors should prefer not only financial covenants to ensure
repayment, such as negative pledge clauses and promises to
maintain revenues (taxes) sufficient to service the debt, but also
institutional changes that reduce the moral hazard of using
borrowed funds for high risk endeavors or that frustrate incentives
to default. It may not be completely off the mark to think of those
who loaned funds to rulers as the medieval equivalent of today's
venture capitalists, who, in return for funding, demand a seat on
the board of directors and guide decisions that are consistent with
the interests of shareholders generally. In effect, the adoption of
institutional structures that restrict discretion constitutes credible
commitments from sovereigns to repay their debts.
Historically, these credible commitments have consisted of private and public institutions that ensured the collection of funds
sufficient to repay debts and the imposition of constraints on
executives who might otherwise divert funds that were collected.54
As demonstrated by the work of Douglass North and Barry
Weingast, these institutions of credible commitment have included
the removal of authority from the executive (in England's case, the
King), such as occurred with the creation of the Bank of England to
handle the government's loan accounts or the assignment to
Parliament of the right to approve loans. 5 The consequence was
that public credit expanded, generating economic growth even as
interest rates fell, and constitutional constraints initially instituted
to ensure creditors' rights evolved into constitutional and political
constraints on the capacity of rulers to interfere with property and
54. See STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 66-67. The relationship between political
representation and credible commitment to repay is such that their coexistence may depend
on underlying economic and political conditions, rather than a purely causal relationship. See
DAVID STASAVAGE, THE RISE OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC
CREDIT IN EUROPE, 1250-1750 (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 5, 7-8).
55. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 139 (1990); Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and
Commitment. The Evolution of Institutions GoverningPublic Choice in Seventeenth-Century
England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 820-21 (1989).
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contract rights generally." The expanded powers of Parliament, the
inclusion of the Contracts Clause into the American Constitution,
and the evolution of an independent judiciary in both societies are
all related in large part to demands imposed on sovereigns by
creditors to restrict the discretion of debtors.5" Indeed, the development of a rich jurisprudence that injected significant substance into
the Contracts Clause emerged in the late nineteenth century, after
states and cities, through irrational exuberance or corruption,
borrowed to finance poorly capitalized railroads and then sought to
repudiate their debt obligations when the promised commercial
benefits failed to materialize.5 8
More recent and more nuanced analyses suggest that the mere
presence of representative assemblies and democratic governance
does not establish the ability of sovereigns to make credible commitments.5 9 That is, democratic institutions are neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition to forestall default or to create an environment of trust that translates into a financial environment that
makes economic growth more plausible.' Nevertheless, democratic
institutions may be more conducive to the circumstances that
permit the creation of credible commitments.6 ' Political parties that
allow logrolling among various interests can provide creditors with
assurances that they can build coalitions to resist default, and
administrative bureaucracies can shield default decisions from the
demands of an autonomous executive.6 In short, political institutions can reduce the risk of financial distress that might discourage
creditors from lending to sovereigns. 3
56. See North & Weingast, supra note 55, at 824-28.
57. See NORTH, supranote 55, at 138-39; Lino A. Graglia, The BurgerCourt and Economic
Rights, 33 TUiSA L.J. 41, 46-47 (1997).
58. See 6 CHARLES FAiRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION, 1864-88, PART ONE 918 (1971). The most important decisions about the reach of the
Contracts Clause continue to involve constraints on governments that seek to repudiate their
debts. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1977).
59. David Stasavage, CredibleCommitment in Early ModernEurope:North and Weingast
Revisited, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 155, 155-56 (2002).
60. See STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 45-47.
61. See Stasavage, supra note 59, at 183-84 (describing the structure of partisan interests
and political coalitions important for the creation of credible commitment).
62. See STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 2-3.
63. See id.
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These analyses suggest that, although the efforts of creditors
to ensure repayment may be motivated by self-interest, they can
generate as a byproduct a series of constraints on the antidemocratic tendencies of officials that is consistent with the
interests of constituents who would otherwise have less capacity to
monitor their officials.' Moreover, economic historians attribute the
presence of institutions that emerge from-or that are consistent
with-the desire to facilitate public debt to the developmental divide
between rich and poor countries, while political scientists attribute
the same phenomenon to the degree of freedom enjoyed by a nation's
citizens.6 5
But I want to explore a stronger claim: that public credit can
enhance democracy not simply because the desire to attract credit
generates institutions that check the exercise of executive discretion, but also because creditors have incentives to monitor the
exercise of that discretion in ways that overcome limits on the
capacity of constituents to deploy those democratic institutions. In
short, the institutions that simultaneously attract credit, support
democracy, and encourage economic development are not selfenforcing. These institutions provide avenues of opportunity that
constituents can exploit to monitor their officials.

II. PUBLIC CREDITORS AS PUBLIC MONITORS
A. The Limits of Monitoring:Shareholdersand Constituents
If constituents fail to take advantage of institutions that facilitate
monitoring, then there is little reason to believe that the presence
of these institutions will enhance democracy. Unless, of course,
some substitute group can compensate for the shortcomings in
constituent monitoring. Can creditors play that role? That is, can
creditors improve democratic governance, not simply by demanding
institutional arrangements that make commitments to repay
credible, but also by direct supervision of the governing process?
64. See id.
65. See generally DEMocRAcY, GOVERNANCE, AND GROWTH (Stephen Knack ed., 2003)
(containing articles describing these institutions as necessary for the relative poverty and
development of nations).
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And if they do so, can they exercise that supervision in a manner
that aligns with the interests of constituents at large? In this
section, I suggest that there is at least a theoretical basis for
concluding that creditors have the capacity to engage in monitoring
that constituents of the state will otherwise avoid. 'Monitoring" in
this context means monitoring for fiscal propriety. The interests of
creditors lie in obtaining repayment of the funds they have loaned.
There is little reason to believe that creditors would fill any gap in
monitoring for official conduct that exhibits moral turpitude or lax
government skills, but does not have budgetary implications. Yet so
much of what governments do, and-as I will suggest below-so
much of what escapes the notice of constituents, 6 is directly tied to
budgetary issues that creditor interventions with respect to
financial conditions would appear to have significant implications
for democratic governance.
Here, a corporate analogy may be appropriate. One underlying
assumption of corporate governance is that capital structure affects
the performance of firms, largely because different capital structures influence the mechanisms of corporate governance and impose different forms of discipline on managers.67 Adding debt to the
firm's capital structure has the positive effect of inducing creditors
to scrutinize managers in a manner that may be unavailable at the
same cost to shareholders." Different creditors of firms have
different capacities to monitor their debtors, although there is
debate about which creditors enjoy which advantage." Much of the
debate about the efficiency of secured credit, for instance, assumes
that unsecured creditors or creditors who have wraparound security
interests in all the firm's assets may monitor the entire firm, while
creditors who lend against specific assets of the firm may closely
monitor only those assets.7 °
66. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
67. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanationsof Dividends, 74 AM. ECON.
REv. 650, 653-54 (1984).
68. See Jensen, supranote 31, at 324 (noting that "debt ...
reduces the cash flow available
for spending at the discretion of managers"); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role
of Debt in Interactive CorporateGovernance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073, 1078 (1995).
69. See Robert E. Scott, A RelationalTheory of Secured Financing,86 COLUM. L. REV. 901,
909-11 (1986) (discussing contradictory positions in context of secured credit).
70. For a summary of the debate as it has played out in literature, see id. at 904-11.
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Credit facilities for firms may also include covenants against
actions that serve as observable proxies for imprudent debtor
behavior. 71 For example, covenants may mandate certain levels of
performance, proscribe activities suggestive of managerial selfdealing, and constitute barometers of financial difficulties within
the firm.72 Indeed, the very existence of fixed payment obligations
is assumed to impose significant discipline on managers, because
missed payments provide a readily detectable indication of mismanagement and trigger consequences more salient than those that
attend other characteristics of managerial slack.73
Finally, debt issuance may reduce agency costs by retarding the
capacity of managers to use corporate assets for projects that cannot
be readily detected, but that deviate from the firm's mission. 74 Debt
covenants, for instance, may obligate managers to pay out "free cash
flows," that is, cash that cannot profitably be reinvested by the
corporation, but that officers and managers might otherwise use to
purchase perquisites or invest in projects with negative net present
value.7 5
These positive aspects of debt are, in theory at least, enhanced
when debt is issued on a secured basis.7 6 The effects of granting
security interests are twofold. First, they create a bond between the
debtor and creditor that encourages the latter to become significantly involved in the operations of the former. 7 Interactions that
increase the debtor's likelihood of success not only ensure repayment of outstanding debt, but also increase the likelihood of future
profitable interactions between the parties. 7' These same interactions facilitate monitoring by giving the creditor significant
information about the debtor's operations. Simultaneously, security
interests encourage monitoring by providing the creditor with a
71. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., A Perspective on Accounting-Based Debt Covenant

Vlations, 68 ACCT. REV. 289, 289-90 (1993).
72. See Triantis & Daniels, supra note 68, at 1093.
73. See id.
74. Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 653-54; Scott, supra note 69, at 909.
75. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 528
(6th ed. 2000); Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 653-54; Jensen, supra note 31, at 323-24.
76. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 56 (1982).
77. See id. at 55-56; Scott, supra note 69, at 926.
78. See Scott, supra note 69, at 937.
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significant payoff for reviewing the firm's financial activity.7 9
Should the firm detect fiscal distress, the security interest provides
a relatively inexpensive mechanism by which the creditor can
exercise leverage, since the assets subject to the security interest
are likely to be essential to the continued operation of the firm and
the threat to foreclose is both credible and relatively inexpensive."0
Should that threat go unheeded, the existence of the security
interest permits the creditor to extricate itself from the relationship
at a lower loss than might be realized by unsecured creditors.8 ' By
taking security interests, creditors can elevate their status in
bankruptcy proceedings and preclude the firm from liquidating
useful assets or from incurring additional debt that might be used
to engage in low-expected-return activities.82
Perhaps most importantly, creditors hold both an ex ante and an
ex post threat against managers who might otherwise be able to
shirk in recognition of the limits of the monitoring capacity of
shareholders. Creditors can effectively foreclose access to capital
markets either by demanding negative pledge clauses or by tying up
sufficient assets to leave little for subsequent creditors.8 3 The
incentives for creditors to act in this way may simply be the in
terrorem effect that presumably deters debtor misbehavior in the
first instance. But more to the immediate point, the capacity of
creditors to detect misbehavior is derivative of the claim that they
monitor the firm. Indeed, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
have suggested that the limited liability of corporations can best be
explained as an inducement for creditors to monitor the corporation,
because the assets of shareholders are unavailable in the event of
default.' Creditors, they contend, may have access to information
unavailable to other stakeholders, such as shareholders who suffer
from collective action problems. Additionally, the fact that recover79. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 425 (2000).
80. See Ronald J. Mann, Explainingthe Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625,
645-47 (1997).
81. Id. at 648-49.
82. See George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor
Priorities,80 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2158-61 (1994); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 68, at 1078.
83. See Mann, supra note 80, at 641-45.
84. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 79, at 425.
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ies can be had only against the firm's assets induces creditors to
85
seize that advantage by monitoring the firm's financial condition.
Many of these aspects of debt have some, if imperfect, analogy to
the market for public credit. If debtholders and constituents are
analogous to public creditors and residents respectively, then the
capacity of private creditors of firms to compensate for any slack in
shareholder monitoring may apply with equal force to the capacity
of creditors of public entities to substitute for passive constituents.
Consider in this regard the need for creditor monitoring. Although
it may occur only out of creditors' own self-interests, it confers a
public benefit if constituents fail to monitor their officials and
creditor monitoring serves as a substitute. There is significant
support for the proposition that constituent monitoring is seriously
limited. 6 Typically, the imperfections that characterize constituent
monitoring emanate from agency costs in the government-citizen
relationship.8 7 If government officials were faithful servants of their
constituents, then monitoring would be superfluous. If, on the other
hand, government officials were self-interested, then they have no
independent reason to pursue the public good when it deviates from
their own self-interest.
There is no shortage of claims that public officials deviate from
the public interest model that underlies the most optimistic view of
democratic governance.88 Examples of self-interested objectives that
might induce public officials to act in a manner inconsistent with
the interests of their constituents include maximization of governmental budgets, maximization of leisure time, or maximization of
post-public service private sector employment opportunities.8 9 Even
the assumed desire that public officials seek reelection or higher
office, which might be thought to require performance of one's
current task in a manner reflective of the public interest, does not
dilute the need for substantial monitoring of official performance.
85. Id.
86. E.g., Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of
Legislators:Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in PoliticalInstitutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103,
107-08 (1990).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., id. at 103-04.
89. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances and Judicial
Intervention, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1057, 1067-68, 1102-03 (2007).
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Continuation in office or elevation to higher office may depend on
the support of discrete groups who may seek a disproportionate
share of public resources or reciprocal support for programs that
either return social benefits less than their costs or are inconsistent
with principles of optimal redistribution.9" Monitoring, therefore,
can detect and deter conduct that is aligned with the interests of
particular groups that might serve the limited objectives of public
officials, but is inconsistent with the interests of constituents at
large.
Stated in these terms, the imperfections of constituent monitoring follow from standard models of collective action. 9' Monitoring
itself constitutes the quintessential public good; an individual act of
monitoring confers benefits on all constituents, none of whom can
be excluded from enjoying the rewards of others' efforts and each of
whom could monitor without foreclosing others' similar conduct.
Thus, no potential beneficiary has an incentive to undertake the
costs of monitoring, as he or she can enjoy identical benefits from
monitoring by others. On this theory, free riding among constituents
on matters of public finance should be prevalent, because the small
consequences that befall any one constituent when an official
misuses public funds is unlikely to justify any individual's expenditure necessary to detect and publicize the misconduct.9" This
remains true even when the aggregate costs of misconduct outweigh
the social benefits of the expenditure.
In this sense, constituents may be perceived as the functional
equivalent of shareholders. According to what one commentator has
called the "passivity story," shareholders similarly face collective
action problems in monitoring corporate officers.9 3 The analogy to
shareholders offers both good news and bad news for constituents
concerned about monitoring public officials. The first piece of bad
news is that, in the absence of monitoring, public officials are more
likely to impose agency costs on their constituents than unmonitored corporate officers. When monitoring is implausible, firms can
90.
91.
OLSON,
92.
93.
(1990).

Id. at 1085-86.
See id. For the paradigmatic discussion on Collective Action Theory, see MANCUR
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17-18 (1982).
Benard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 526-29
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adopt alternative strategies to counteract the tendencies of officers
to pursue personal interests. s4 Firms, for instance, can bond officers
to shareholder interests, through means such as including in
compensation packages stock options and incentive pay schemes
that are tied to firm performance. Additionally, firms are sufficiently flexible to adopt organizational structures that separate
agents who initiate and implement decisions from those who ratify
and monitor decisions. A board of directors may thus explicitly
disapprove proposed officer actions that conflict with shareholder
interests.9 5
Constituents of public entities have fewer available mechanisms
to bond public officials.96 As often noticed in the literature on
privatization of governmental functions, the operations that public
officials supervise do not generate residual profits in which officials
can be granted an interest. 97 Governments may use external
monitors, but any such review is likely to be haphazard, rather
than a systematic review as conducted by a board of directors.98 For
example, the prospect of judicial review should constrain officials'
willingness to deviate from the interests of constituents. But even
when official defalcations diverge sufficiently from expectations to
create a reviewable claim, judicial intervention requires that
interested litigants initiate legal action. This requirement simply
replicates the collective action problem of finding a party with a
sufficient stake in the outcome to justify the litigation costs. Even
when fiscal programs are challenged, judicial deference to political
decisions that concern public expenditures may be appropriate,
given the relative institutional competence of political and judicial
decision makers.9 There is little reason to believe that courts have
94. Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 653-54.
95. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separationof Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 307-08, 311 (1983).
96. See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Incentive Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 70-80 (1991) (describing the shortcomings of using judicial
review to curb interest group influence over public officials).
97. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provisions, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1185, 1189-90 (1996); Michael H. Schill, PrivatizingFederalLow Income HousingAssistance:
The Case of Public Housing,75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 883-84 (1990).
98. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 95, at 311.
99. See Elhauge, supra note 96, at 78 (describing problems related to judicial review of
legislation).
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any advantage over even flawed political processes in applying the
potentially broad scope that might legitimately be given to "public
purpose" expenditures or to financial arrangements that might
plausibly comply with the objectives of "debt" limitations.1 °" Courts
are also likely to be highly imperfect monitors because they have
limited ability to reverse engineer political decisions and distinguish benign political deals from malign rent-seeking.' °' Judges,
after all, have little capacity to replicate or second-guess the kinds
of budgetary tradeoffs and investment strategies that affect
decisions about capital expenditures on local public goods.0 2 In
theory, courts can effectively limit the capacity of discrete, wellorganized interests to override constituents' preferences. In practice,
however, courts will have difficulty distinguishing between financial
decisions that respond to interest group entreaties and those that
respond to well-intentioned constituent desires, but that nevertheless impose diffuse costs and confer concentrated benefits-the
hallmark of interest group dominance. 0 3 Indeed, fiscal decisions will
systematically share those characteristics, insofar as taxes used to
construct or operate a facility will be widely imposed, while the
facility's benefits may be enjoyed differentially. 0 4 Without some
relatively clear indication of fiscal impropriety, it is therefore
unsurprising that courts tend to refrain from the kind of financial
risk assessment for which the doctrines of public purpose, debt, and
lending of credit serve as proxies. 1°' Moreover, governments could
100. Gillette, supra note 89, at 1117-18.
101. See id. at 1096-97.
102. See Elhauge, supra note 96, at 84.
103. Id. at 78.
104. See Gillette, supra note 89, at 1117-18 (describing a scenario in which public funding
is used to construct a golf course used predominately by the rich).
105. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution:"State Fiscal Limits and State
ConstitutionalLaw, 34 RUTGERs L.J. 907, 956 (2003). I have argued that there may be some
satisfactory metrics, predicated on the issue of who bears the risk of project failure, for
whether a particular financing scheme violates constitutional debt limits. See Clayton P.
Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 365, 381-83 (2004).
Although such a test is more readily administrable by a court, it admittedly does not
eliminate the need for a more difficult inquiry in some cases. At the same time, even if courts
could adopt an easily administrable test, the very existence of debt limits must be judged
against alternative measures for constraining fiscal overextension. The vast array of debt
limitations reveals that even drafters of such provisions in deliberative constitutional
conventions could not develop a single metric that can properly be used to determine the
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not easily adopt more rigorous private sector models that provide
oversight or division of decision making authority. Constitutional
structures and legal doctrines preclude local governments from
delegating responsibilities in a manner that would provide disinterested nonresidents significant authority over local decision
making.106
At the same time, shirking of duties by public officials may be less
detectable than shirking by officers of firms. The willingness of
constituents or shareholders to monitor will be inversely proportional to costs, and the costs of monitoring increase when information about officials' performance is not readily available in a
digestible form. Even when financial information about governmental performance exists, it is rarely transparent. Governmental
budgets are long, complex, and difficult to decipher, such that it is
not in the interest of the average constituent to take the time to
discover defalcations. Even at the local level, where free riding on
the monitoring efforts of others might be diminished by lower
populations than at the state or federal level, systematic review of
fiscal programs is likely to be rare. Just as an example, I would
venture that few residents of the City of Williamsburg, Virginia
have perused either the 280-page Fiscal Year 2008 Adopted
Budget 10 7 or the 91-page Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
for Fiscal Year 2007,1°8 even though both are readily available on
the city's website.
In firms, information about performance can be garnered from
comparing the performances of competitors; however, since governconditions under which financial obligations threaten the financial viability of states and their
political subdivisions. Courts deciding whether a particular project fails to satisfy a public
purpose, or threatens the objectives of a constitutional limitation, are not likely to have a
significantly easier job.
106. For instance, the nondelegation doctrine and constitutional grants of home rule would
arguably preclude localities from creating the functional equivalent of an outside board of
directors to review the intramural decisions of local officials. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1461 (2008) (defining the
nondelegation doctrine as prohibiting Congress from delegating 'law-elaborating authority"
to agencies without guidelines sufficient to permit robust judicial review).
107. See 2008 CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG, VA., ADOPTED BUDGET, available at http://www.
ci.williamsburg.va.us/lndex.aspx?page=300.
108. See 2007 CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG, VA., COMPREHENSIVE ANN. FIN. REP. [hereinafter
ANN. FIN. REP.], availableat http://www.ci.wiliamsburg.va.us/modules/ShowDocument.aspx?
documentid=237.
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ment-provided services tend to be monopolies, similar comparisons
cannot readily be found" 9 Even when multiple localities offer the
same service (for example, mass transportation), intercity comparisons are of limited utility. Comparisons of subway fares per mile in
New York and San Francisco, for instance, cannot easily be made
without considering relative costs of living, construction costs,
number of riders, and age of the system. Even property tax rates are
not easily comparable, because the utility of the information that
they generate will depend on the more mysterious metric of the
proportion of market value used to derive the actual taxes that
property holders pay."'
From the perspective of constituents, the second piece of bad
news in the shareholder-resident analogy is that shareholders can
solve collective action problems in ways that residents cannot.
Shareholders vary significantly in the extent of their interests in the
firm; some may have invested little of their wealth in the firm, while
others may be substantially invested in the same firm. But the
public goods nature of monitoring suggests that not all principals
have to monitor to deter agent misconduct. Since deterrence of
officer misconduct by some confers benefits on all, it is sufficient if
there exist groups with a large enough stake in corporate performance to warrant intervention. Thus, institutional investors are
frequently seen as surrogates for smaller investors."'
Of course, constituents also have disparate interests. Some will
of
have disproportionately high stakes in their locality, by virtue 12
investment.
immobile
relatively
other
or
job,
property ownership,
As in the case of institutional investors with significant stakes in
109. The real distinction may be between entities that face competition and those that do
not. See JOHN DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 64, 67, 147 (1989). Still there is a
greater tendency for firms to face competition for a particular service than for municipalities
to do so.
110. See John A. Miller, RationalizingInjustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax,
22 HOFsTRA L. REv. 79, 85 (1993) (asserting that assessments often fail to keep pace with
property appreciation, resulting in fractional assessments; and that these assessments serve
to cap property "tax bills in an inflationary economy").
111. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 66-67 (1991); Black, supra note 93, at 523-25, 587; John C. Coffee, Liquidity
Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277,
1284-85 (1991) (pointing out that institutional investors may have interests that deviate from
those of other shareholders).
112. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5, 74-75 (2001).
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firms, these constituents may find it worthwhile to monitor against
official misconduct. Landowners who pay large sums in property
taxes or individuals who benefit from government programs that
will be underfunded if the government is operated inefficiently all
have incentives to overcome collective action obstacles that are
typically attributed to political constituents. 113 In addition, to the
extent that those with high stakes are willing to underwrite the
costs of discovering and disseminating information about the
misconduct of local officials, they-like institutional shareholders of
firms--can reduce search costs for other constituents who are
interested in detecting misconduct. Thus, one might initially believe
that those with low stakes will be able to free ride on those to whom
monitoring is worthwhile in the public as well as the private sector.
But the analogy between institutional investors and constituents
with significant local stakes collapses once we consider the extent
to which those who do monitor serve as proxies for the interests of
those who do not. In the corporate context we fairly assume that all
shareholders, regardless of the size of their stake in the firm, share
a monolithic objective of maximizing the values of their shares."'
There may be variations among shareholders, so that those who
anticipate short shareholding periods may prefer corporate strategies that differ from those preferred by shareholders who anticipate
longer shareholding periods."' But the fact that all shareholders
seek some form of profit maximization, and that both large and
small shareholders could have either long- or short-term interests,
ensures that the objectives of shareholders with high stakes, for
whom monitoring is cost effective, will largely coincide with those
with low stakes." 6 Thus, the latter can free ride on the former with
relative impunity.
113. See id. at 75 (arguing that homeowners' reduced mobility makes them eager to
organize to protect home values).
114. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 6 (1991).
115. However, some believe that even institutional investors are overly concerned with the
short-term performance of public firms and therefore are less likely to play a role in
monitoring the corporation. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System
of CorporateGovernance:The QuinquennialElection of Directors,58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 20506 (1991).
116. See id. at 208 (presenting the efficient capital markets hypothesis as a result of a
blend of the long- and short-term).
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The market for managers and takeover markets further facilitates these efforts. Even if monitoring does not occur on a very wide
scale, market mechanisms may provide substitute constraints on
self-interested officers of firms. Officials who do not pursue the
profit-maximizing interests of shareholders are likely to lose
employees who can obtain better terms of employment at more
financially successful competitors." 7 The possibility of takeovers
provides potential acquirers with an incentive to monitor the firm's
performance and to disseminate negative information at low cost to
other shareholders, simultaneously providing them with opportunities to support those who promise more significant returns for all
shareholders."'
The situation is different in the public sector. Consider first the
conflicting interests that emerge from different residents' expected
period of residency. These periods may be analogous to shareholders' expected periods of shareholding. Constituents who rent rather
than own their homes and who anticipate leaving the jurisdiction
within a relatively short period of time may prefer local officials to
incur significant capital burdens in order to provide substantial
public goods and services in the near term. Those constituents will
receive the current benefit of the projects, but may not bear the full
share of their costs through either tax or rent payments, some of
which will be deferred to future residents. Thus, assuming imperfect
capitalization of future payments into current property values,
current short-term constituents may systematically prefer that the
government incur more debt than residents who anticipate long
periods of residency." 9 If the latter group is more likely to monitor
officials, they would not necessarily serve as good proxies for the
former group. It is less clear, however, that this divergence would
problematically distort monitoring. If residents who are expecting
117. See id. at 214-15.
118. See id. at 197-98.
119. Residents who anticipate emigrating soon may also have less reason to incur the costs
associated with voting, because they will not be able to enjoy the benefits of their votes, or
may belong to the group of relatively poor who do not vote with the same frequency as
wealthier residents. See, e.g., Mark Thomas Quinlivan, Comment, One Person, One Vote
Revisited: The Impending Necessity of JudicialInterventionin the Realm of Voter Registration,
137 U. PENN. L. REv. 2361, 2368 (1989) (noting that "[vioter participation has always been
strongly related with socioeconomic factors," and that as a result, the poor experience lower
rates of voter participation).
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to exit the jurisdiction in a relatively short period of time (especially
tenants who are unconcerned about the capitalization of new
projects into higher property taxes) would otherwise be urging a
supraoptimal amount of debt, then the omission of their interests
from the process is unlikely to skew local officials to act irresponsibly.
There is, moreover, an alternative source of friction that complicates monitoring in the public sector. Even the most well-meaning
(publicly interested) resident may fail to represent residents
generally, because the objective function that governments legitimately pursue varies more widely than is the case with firms.12 0 As
I noted above, all shareholders will be concerned with profit
maximization in the firm. But governments, at least multifunction
governments, have no such single objective.' Governments provide
some services, such as paving roads, police or defense services, and
environmental cleanup, to solve market failures. But governments
also offer some services, or modify the market allocation of collective
goods, to engage in redistribution (for instance, municipal day care
centers or other welfare services); and offer still other services that
implicate both efficiency and distributional concerns (education
may be an example). Moreover, the absence of a readily verifiable
metric of success, such as profits, complicates the problem of
determining whether public services and the officials who run them
are performing in the public interest.'2 2 Even if we were to disagree
over whether long-term or short-term profitability were the proper
measure of corporate success, it is still more complex to determine,
for instance, whether a school system is doing "its job." We could
analyze standardized test scores, graduation rates, college acceptance rates, or any of a number of other variables that presumably
serve as proxies for the quality of education. Thus, both the
objective function of governments and the determination of whether
that function has been satisfied may be subject to disputes far more
contentious than in the case of firms.
120. See Clayton P. Gillette, ConstrainingMisuse of Funds from IntergovernmentalGrants,
in FISCAL FEDERALISM IN UNITARY STATES 101, 102 n.1 (Per Molander ed., 2004) (stating that
local officials may think about the public welfare differently than other constituents).
121. Jean Tirole, The Internal Organizationof Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1,
3 (1994).
122. Id. at 3-4.
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This multiplicity of functions and ambiguity in measurement
has several consequences. First, it frustrates efforts of potential
monitors to determine whether local officials are doing a "good job."
Conduct that satisfies such a standard is less observable by
principals and less verifiable to third parties when agents must
simultaneously perform potentially conflicting tasks (for example,
efficient waste disposal may conflict with offering all residents equal
access to waste disposal) than when agents can be evaluated against
a single observable metric, such as profit maximization. 12 3 This
phenomenon means that officials themselves cannot easily determine which financial strategy is consistent with constituent
preferences. The binary nature of voting in public elections requires
that votes be cast based on an assessment of the overall performance of candidates. An official who wins an election will be unable
to determine whether constituents were pleased with all of his or
her policies, a majority of those policies, or only a minimum of those
policies. The multiplicity of government objectives that I referred to
above makes discerning any message from electoral results still
more difficult to interpret.
Second, to the extent that officials pursue multiple objectives,
even those constituents who have high enough stakes to justify
monitoring are unlikely to represent the interests of all constituents, at least outside of small jurisdictions that offer limited services
and attract a largely homogeneous population.12 4 Even if we assume
publicly interested actors, constituents with interests sufficiently
intense to warrant monitoring are likely to equate the public's
interest with their own. If, for instance, I live next door to a public
park, I will care with great intensity of purpose that it be maintained in a manner that ensures its cleanliness and safety. I am
likely to identify my own interest in the adequacy of the park with
that of the public generally. I may then feel perfectly righteous in
lobbying for and monitoring the use of maximum expenditures
for the park, even though funding for that purpose may require
reduced expenditures for other services like school nurses or paved
123. See id.
124. These jurisdictions form the basis for William Fischel's "Homevoter Hypothesis" that
local taxpayers constrain the capacity of local officials to provide local public goods other than
those preferred by residents. See FISCHEL, supra note 112, at 4, 19, 73-76.
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sidewalks-services in which I have a lesser interest. My desire for
maximum spending on my objective, in short, is likely to vary from
the median constituent's view of optimal spending on the same
objective. But the median constituent, by virtue of having no special
interest in any subject, is unlikely to monitor for the sale of his or
her competing objectives, simply because those with only average
interest in expenditures suffer from the inducement to free ride on
others with similar preferences.
Thus, with respect to those who have high enough stakes in the
public entity to monitor, the problem is not failure to constrain
public officials; rather, it is that if these constituents have such an
idiosyncratic stake in the conduct of public officials to justify
incurring monitoring costs, then one might wonder what they are
monitoring for. Think, for instance, of the media, which qualifies as
one of the standard theoretical substitutes for lax constituent
monitoring.'2 5 By discovering and reporting on official scandals, the
media may be able to increase circulation and individual reporters
may enhance their reputations, so one might think that their selfinterested objectives would transform them into effective proxies for
free riding constituents. But, short of criminal activity that affects
budgetary outlays, the media tends to scandalize low value defalcations in lieu of making more costly investigations into misappropriation of public funds. Recent events in New York provide a revealing
illustration: In a two-week span, New York government suffered
two substantial setbacks. One was related to the failure of the New
York Metropolitan Transit Authority to make the capital improvements that it promised to deliver in return for fare hikes that it
had received.12 The other involved former Governor Elliot Spitzer's
personal expenditures.' 7 I will leave to the reader's speculation the
issue of which story consumed more ink and newsprint.
Public unions that have a stake in the public budget may also
monitor to ensure their financial security. But the objectives for
which they monitor will not necessarily coincide with those of
125. See Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess & Andrea Prat, Mass Media and Political
Accountability, in THE RIGHT TO TELL 45, 45 (Roumeen Islam et al. eds., 2002).
126. William Neuman, MT.A. Delays Improvements, Citing Drop in Real Estate Sales
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at B1.
127. See Danny Hakim & William K Rashbaum, Spitzer, Linked to a Sex Ring as a Client,
Gives an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at Al.
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constituents whose concern is for the overall health of the municipality. For example, teachers' unions may, in the name of educational quality, monitor the school budget to ensure that salaries are
consistent with those of other school districts, but be less concerned
with total educational expenditures or with whether taxes, which
are used to pay their salaries, are set at optimal rates.
This is not to say that there are no public analogues to the market
mechanisms that constrain officers of firms in the absence of
monitoring. Take, for instance, the constraint on officers of a firm
that is created by the takeover market, which suggests that officers
will seek to maximize returns for shareholders.12 Local officials
likewise face a robust takeover market in the form of political
opposition. Potential political opponents have significant incentives
both to monitor behavior of incumbent officials and to disseminate
information about shirking to the electorate. The problem with
relying on electoral monitoring, therefore, is not limited to the high
costs of discovering information (political opponents should be
willing to subsidize those costs), the infrequency of elections, or
small turnouts. The various objectives of constituents and the
preference of voters for low value, but salient, indicia of success
provide political challengers little incentive to scrutinize fiscal data
with more than cursory attention. If the streets are clean and
property taxes have remained stable, a decrease in bond rating will
be of less concern, even though it may foretell a more difficult
financial future.
In some respects, one might anticipate more monitoring by
constituents than by shareholders. Costly monitoring becomes
unnecessary if one can exit an investment at relatively low cost
after one discovers misconduct.' 29 Those who hold shares in firmsat least in publicly held firms-typically face thick markets for
shares, and thus can exit easily once their tolerance for misconduct
is exceeded. 3 0 Selling shares may entail some financial loss, but a
well-diversified shareholder should be able to absorb that loss with
128. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 96-97 (observing that takeover
markets increase future costs of poor performance, thus helping to assure contractual
performance).
129. See FISCHEL, supra note 112, at 74.
130. Id.
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minimal dislocation. Investments in homes, jobs, and communities
are more costly to exit and less easily diversified.'' As a result, we
might anticipate that constituents would invest more in monitoring
to forestall or detect value-reducing misconduct at an early stage. In
light of all the disincentives to monitor that constituents face,
however, it is difficult to believe that high exit costs alone are
sufficient to overcome the collective action problem.
The result may be that the sum total of public monitoring is
132
not undersupplied, as classic collective action theory suggests.
Instead, monitoring may be maldistributed. That is, it is oversupplied for discrete functions that affect an intensely interested group,
and undersupplied for functions that have diffuse effects. As a
result, public officials may not face optimal monitoring for any
functions. Members of an intensely interested group may effectively
lobby for services and expenditures that provide them with significant benefits. If that group's preferences fail to coincide with the
preferences of constituents generally, there is little reason to predict
that the group serves as a representative proxy for those who would
prefer to free ride.
B. Creditorsto the Rescue?
Can creditors enter this void and solve these collective action
problems? The tentative answer I want to give is,"it depends." Let
me begin with reasons for optimism. There are a variety of ways in
which the interests of creditors compensate for the collective action
failures that dilute the monitoring capacity of constituents. The first
is simply one of numbers. There will tend to be fewer creditors than
there are constituents. Since numbers have some, if imperfect,
relationship to free riding, 33 the relative inability of a small number
of creditors to free ride on the efforts of others suggests that any
given creditor will be more willing to play a role in monitoring
131. See id. at 74-75.
132. See OLSON, supra note 91, at 31. But cf. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource
Allocationin AdministrativeLaw, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 45 (2008) (attributing the undersupply
of monitoring to inaction); John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States'Rights:A
Defense of JudicialReview in a FederalSystem, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 98 (2004) (attributing
undersupply of monitoring to rational ignorance and multiple principals).
133. See HARDIN, supra note 92, at 182.
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officials than any given noncreditor constituent. To return to
Williamsburg, Virginia, the financial statements reveal that public
credit tends to be extended by bank loans or through the issuance
of bonds.' A bank that is the sole lender will obviously have a
significant incentive to monitor the source of repayment. Even in
the event of bonded debt, in which the ultimate bondholders may be
numerous, the collective action problem may be at least partially
solved by the presence of a trustee, who is appointed to receive
funds for repayment and who can at least provide early warning
signals of impending financial distress.' 5
Second, creditors, at least those within the same class, have a
common interest. They want to be paid; they care about the overall
fiscal health of the debtor in ways that divided interests within the
jurisdiction are willing to ignore.' 3 6 Thus, creditors can overcome the
problems related to the multiplicity of objectives that preclude one
set of constituents from serving as proxies for others. At least to the
extent that creditors are secured by the general revenues of the
debtor, they are less interested in the provision of any particular
service than in the overall fiscal health of the jurisdiction.
Here, the analogy to corporate creditors threatens to break down.
I noted above that monitoring by corporate creditors is likely to be
enhanced by secured credit, which provides both a bond between the
creditor and debtor and allows the exercise of leverage in the event
of threatened fiscal distress."'3 Sovereign debtors, however, are less
likely to be able to grant security interests to private creditors. In
the event of default, creditors will not be able to seize the city's
fire trucks or the state's military equipment. Even when creditors
lend against a dedicated revenue stream, such as tolls from a toll
bridge erected with loan proceeds, creditors may benefit from a
rate covenant that assures that minimum tolls are charged. But

134. See, e.g., ANN. FIN. REP., supra note 108, at 6 ("At June 30, 2007, outstanding
liabilities were $17.3 Million, with $14.4 Million in bonds and notes payable.").
135. See Levmore, supra note 76, at 73-74 (discussing the trustee as a provider of a
warning system that aids in monitoring).
136. See Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88
B.U. L. REv. 633, 664 (2008) (remarking that creditor monitoring plays an important role in
maintaining fiscal health).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 76-84.
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creditors will not be able to foreclose on the toll bridge in the event
that collections are insufficient to service the debt.
The unavailability of security interests, however, does not mean
that creditors will fail to monitor. It may instead mean that creditors will find a substitute for pledged physical assets. For instance,
creditors may develop benchmarks that are observable and that
serve as indicia of financial success or failure, and monitor to see
whether those benchmarks have been achieved. If creditors are able
to withhold additional funding or accelerate repayments in the
event of failure to maintain benchmarks, then the effect may be the
same as if the creditor could make a credible threat to foreclose on
collateral essential for the firm's success.
Indeed, let me go further and claim that creditors will exercise
their monitoring capacity in a manner that actually improves
decision making over what would occur even if constituents could
overcome the obstacles to collective action. Creditors may be absorbed in the financial wherewithal of the debtor to avoid default.
But that interest requires a commitment to stability, overall
welfare, and tradeoffs among different governmental functions that
decision making by a more participatory process, dominated by
interest groups that divide an expanded budget pie rather than by
pluralistic compromise, will endanger.
Thus, even Hume, with all his antipathy to public debt, acknowledged the mollifying influence that creditors could impose on a
public driven by internal strife to be "factious, mutinous, seditious,
and even perhaps rebellious."'38 In a rare moment of praise for debt,
he responds:
But to this evil the national debts themselves tend to provide a
remedy. The first visible eruption, or even immediate danger, of
public disorders must alarm all the stock-holders [by which he
meant creditors], whose property is the most precarious of any;
and will make them fly to the support of government, whether
menaced by Jacobitish violence or democratical frenzy.'39

138. HUME, supra note 44, at 170.
139. Id.
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Here, we face the next assumption about the democratizing
effects of public debt: that creditors who monitor will do so in a
manner that reflects the interests of constituents. Of course, the
alignment of interests between creditors and constituents will be
closer when the two classes are composed of the same individuals.
Certainly, public creditors who are also stakeholders in other
aspects of the debtor's activities, by virtue of their roles as taxpayers, tenants, or business operators, are likely to balance their
various roles and subordinate their interests as creditors when
doing so generates net benefits to them in their other roles. 4 0 I have
previously indicated that the large overlap between San Giorgio
shareholders and Genoa residents may have facilitated the latter's
willingness to forgo technical defaults motivated by true financial
distress.' The same phenomenon may explain the success of the
Dutch financing system. Dutch creditors were, to a large extent,
Dutch citizens. 4 2 Macdonald cites estimates that at a time when
there were approximately 100,000 Dutch households, 65,000
were creditors of the state.'4 3 These included public officials who,
albeit not popularly elected, provided comfort to citizens that their
financial interests would be served because failure to do so would
adversely affect the decision makers as well as the populace.'4 4
To some extent, this alignment of interests between creditors and
constituents seemed to underlie Alexander Hamilton's views about
public credit.'4 5 His argument for national assumption of state
debts and of embracing a policy of national debt generally was based
in part on the capacity of debt to create affinities between an
146
important property-holding class and the national government.
In his January 1790 Report to Congress on Public Debt, Hamilton
famously wrote:
140. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
141. MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 142; Fratianni, supranote 3, at 188; see also supranotes
8-12 and accompanying text.
142. MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 154-55.
143. Id. at 156.
144. See id. ("Because the officers of the state themselves held large portions of their
fortunes in government debt, every public creditor could be sure that his investment was
safe.").
145. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON PUBLIC
CREDIT (1790), reprinted in THE WORKS OFALEXANDERHAMILTON 1 (N.Y., Williams & Whiting
1810).
146. See id.
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If all the public creditors receive their dues from one source,
distributed with an equal hand, their interest will be the same.
And having the same interests, they will unite in the support of
the fiscal arrangements of the Government-as these, too, can
be made with more convenience when there is no competition ....
If, on the contrary, there are distinct provisions, there will be
distinct interests, drawing different ways. That union and
concert of views, among the creditors, which in every government is of great importance to their security, and to that of
public credit, will not only not exist, but14 7will be likely to give
place to mutual jealousy and opposition.
When Hamilton then pronounced a properly funded national debt
to be "a national blessing,"' 4 8 did he have in mind that creditors
would confer on the United States a class of monitors who would
demand more democratic processes than constituents alone would
require? Was he simply saying that national creditors would be
more drawn to identify with the United States and thus assist in
strengthening a federal government? Or was he also saying that
they would constitute a propertied class that would improve the
quality of decision making otherwise made by an electorate that,
although narrow by today's standard, could be driven by sensitivities inconsistent with Hamilton's mercantile vision? I am not
certain. One thing that does seem clear, though, is that Hamilton
viewed creditors as having interests that could reduce the risks of
factionalism that might otherwise endanger collective welfare.'4 9
But what are the implications of this phenomenon for the
situation in which creditors are not constituents of the debtor? Does
it necessarily follow that these creditors will be poor representatives? At least in one respect, Hamilton's concerns reflect a possibility that creditors may actually make better financial decisions
than would be made by the constituents of debtors.15 Hamilton's
comments reflect a difficult inquiry posed by any democratic theory
based on government accountability to constituent preferences:

147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.

Id. at 52.
See id. at 19.
See id. at 19-20.
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whose preferences count?' 5 ' The question of long-term fiscal
planning implicates that issue to the extent that it deals with intertemporal externalities. Current financial decisions that require
long-term payments can impose significant costs on future generations who have little to say about the desirability of the long-term
obligation at the time it is incurred. Optimal financial decisions, one
would think, would reflect the interests of those who pay long-term
costs as well as those who enjoy the short-term benefits. Who, as
between creditors who fund long-term projects and current constituents, are better positioned to represent those future constituents?
Because public credit necessarily requires attention to the risk of
future payments, perhaps public creditors better internalize the
benefits and burdens that financial decisions impose on both current
and future generations than the more traditional delegation of those
issues to the present generation of constituents alone.
Decisions to fund capital improvements with a payment stream
that extends for several decades necessarily commit creditors to a
time horizon that exceeds the notoriously short attention span of
public officials concerned primarily about the next election, 152 or the
high discount rate of constituents concerned about the level of taxes
that they must pay today.1 53 Current constituents, for instance, may
favor projects that generate immediate benefits, imposing the
costs on future generations who may find the projects superfluous.
Or, current constituents may favor default, especially when the
creditors are nonresidents and those who would bear the burdens of
taxation necessary to service the current debt are residents. Those
current constituents may be either oblivious or indifferent to the
default premium that future generations of residents will be
required to pay.
This is precisely the situation that arose in the late nineteenth
century when cities and states incurred substantial debts to attract
railroads that promised to confer commercial benefits sufficient to
offset any tax burden necessary to service the government's financial obligations. When those successful railroads failed to material151. See id. at 20.
152. See Sungjoon Cho, Doha's Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 165, 201 (2007).
153. See Peter H. Aranson & Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Compensationof PublicOfficials as
a Campaign Issue: An Economic Analysis of Brown v. Hartilage, 2 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV.
213, 249 (1983).
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ize, taxpayers were left with the legal obligation to pay debt service,
but none of the promised benefits. Throughout the South and
Midwest, cities and states did what any debtor with a brief time
horizon would do-they repudiated their debts.154 Did they have to?
That is, were they facing such financial distress if they complied
with their obligations that repudiation was the only way to avoid
dissolution? In that case, repudiation may not have been a manifestation of a brief time horizon, but only of an exogenous shock that
makes repayment impracticable, all things considered. Nevertheless, urban historian Eric Monkkonen's study of the phenomenon
suggests that many of the defaults on railroad bonds were less the
result of the kinds of fiscal distress that might have generated
sympathy and waiver from the shareholders of San Giorgio 5 ' than
the consequence of class, ethnic, and political interests that ignored
consequences for future generations. 5 ' If we include within "constituents" of the debtor those future residents who pay for the fiscal
errors of prior generations, then creditor demands may better reflect
the interests of at least that class of constituents than current
taxpayers alone.' 57
Creditors may also vary from constituents in that they are likely
to have a different preference for risk."18 Although this may suggest
a lack of alignment in the interests of the two groups, we might
favor creditor monitoring for risk if creditors exhibit a more rational
strategy of dealing with the long-term health of the debtor. Let us
return again to the potentially analogous corporate sector. In the
corporate setting, the divergence of interests between creditors and
debtors is largely related to the role of each in setting the proper
level of risk taking by the firm. Equity holders may favor a high
degree of risk taking because they are essentially gambling with
154. See ERIC MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBuC MoNEY AND AMERICAN CITIES 24,

27-30 (1995) ("[The city of Duluth and the Minnesota state legislature used legal maneuvers
to cheat the city's bondholders of the early 1870s out of any hope of full debt recovery.").
155. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
156. See MONKKONEN, supra note 154, at 24.
157. See id. at 22-23. Monkkonen discussed Memphis, Tennessee and Watertown,
Wisconsin as examples in which future residents suffered as a result of decisions by current
taxpayers. Id.
158. For example, William A. Fischel argues that homeowners are unique in that they are
particularly sensitive to "the vulnerability of their largest asset," which is their home.
FISCHEL, supranote 112, at 12. Fischel also notes that homeowners may attach a sentimental
value to their homes. Id.
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creditors' money. If the firm borrows money with a promise of
engaging in relatively low risk activities, and subsequently engages
in relatively high risk activities, the firm gets all the upside of its
gamble-the creditors, though, receive only repayment of principal
and interest. 59 If the venture fails, the creditors who supplied the
funds bear the loss. As a result, creditors have incentives to monitor
the firm who proposes to borrow funds for one purpose, but then
deploys the funds for a riskier endeavor.
Governmental entities are more constrained in the activities in
which they can engage, and thus the level of risk they can take with
borrowed funds may be less variable. It is, for example, difficult to
hide a risky sports stadium in the guise of the municipal power
plant that the locality indicated was the objective for which it was
borrowing funds. But money is fungible, and governments can use
funds from one source to free up funds from an alternative source
and gamble with the latter in ways that expose the government as
a whole to greater risk. A creditor who has both the capacity and the
incentive to examine revenues and expenditures can serve much of
the same risk-reducing function that is attributed to the general
lender of private firms. Thus, creditor monitoring may also limit
governmental risk taking to a level more consistent with constituent
preferences.
I am not, of course, positing a perfect identity of interests between
creditors and constituents. The complicated issue of who the
"constituents" are means that at least some within that groupperhaps tenants with short-term interests in residence-will find
little similarity of interests with long-term creditors. Additionally,
even if creditor monitoring forestalls government insolvency
should bankruptcy occur, the interests of constituents in continuing
governmental services will diverge greatly from the interests of
creditors in raising taxes and liquidating governmental assets to
assure payment. Should the municipal borrower prove able to pay
only school teachers or creditors, local residents may opt for the
former, while bondholders would obviously desire the latter.
Alternatively, once doubts are raised about the locality's future
ability to make debt service payments, creditors are likely to want
the locality to increase fees, while residents will want to shift the
159. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 111, at 68.
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risk of nonpayment to creditors. 6 ° These disputes about remedies
indicate divergent interests of creditors and residents; they do not,
however, indicate differences in the desire to detect fiscal impropriety before the events that would create such disputes arise.
What I am positing is that, at least from a theoretical perspective,
it is plausible that the interests of creditors and constituents will
overlap sufficiently to allow the former to compensate for some of
the monitoring lapses of the latter. Whether creditors will do so
depends on a variety of factors, such as the extent to which creditors
and constituents overlap and the structure of the transaction.
Obviously, when creditors can be repaid without regard to the
overall health of the borrower, such as when their payments come
from only a single resource, creditors have little incentive to monitor
more than that resource. Historically, creditor monitoring would
have been diluted by allowing creditors to seek repayment directly
from taxpayers rather than from the state.'' Seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century French debts were incurred largely by the
selling of offices to creditors who were willing to advance cash in
return for subsequent payments from the state or the value of
future tax revenues that could be collected through the offices.' 6'
Venal office holders had a claim to the first taxes collected, so that
once they collected the sums due to them, they had weakened
incentives to collect the remaining sums that would be paid to the
state.'6 3 I will say only that this mechanism does not inspire
confident predictions either that an optimal level of taxes will be
collected or that, once collected, state funds will be expended in
pursuit of social welfare.
Our thicker understanding of sovereignty suggests that we are
less likely to delegate tax collection than were city-states and
160. For example, in Pattersonv. Carey, 363 N.E.2d 1146 (N.Y. 1977), New York State had
granted Jones Beach State Parkway Authority the power to increase the toll on the parkway,
but subsequently passed a law rescinding an increase that the Jones Beach State Parkway
Authority authorized. Id. at 1151-53. Much of the jurisprudence of the Contracts Clause has
been written in terms of conflicts between the interests of municipal creditors and residents
when fiscal distress precludes simultaneous satisfaction of each group's preference. See, e.g.,
U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 305
(1886); Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 555 (1866).
161. See STASAVAGE, supra note 30, at 86.
162. Id.
163. MACDONALD, supra note 5, at 141.
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capital-hungry monarchs. But transactional structures still matter.
The extent to which creditors can credibly substitute for constituents depends on the extent to which the creditors' repayment
rights are linked to the overall fiscal health of the debtor. Some
transactional structures (such as bonds secured by a locality's
general revenues) align those interests, but others, which limit
creditor's rights to particular assets, may not. A lender secured
solely by waterworks revenues, for example, has little incentive to
monitor the debtor's receipt of property taxes, although the latter
may be a better indicator of officials' performance. Legal doctrines
may further frustrate monitoring by denying creditors the ability to
take security interests in assets that might be easily monitored and
that might serve as proxies for overall fiscal health. Potential
lenders might also find monitoring worthwhile if they believed that
the default risk was sufficiently high and had no lower cost way of
dealing with such risk. In the next section, I suggest that significant
obstacles to creditor monitoring arise from the availability of low
cost alternatives to risk management that may reduce the scope of
monitoring. But, as I will conclude, it may also focus monitoring on
those situations where constituents are also most in need of
external support to create democratic governance.

III. WILLINGNESS TO MONITOR
My argument to this point has been that historical lessons and
corporate analogies tell us a great deal about the extent to which
the theoretical capacity of creditors to compensate for suboptimal
constituent monitoring can actually be implemented. But there is
also reason to believe that creditors may fail to take advantage of
these opportunities. Monitoring is costly, and potential monitors, if
rational, will only undertake that task when (1) the costs of
monitoring are less than expected benefits, such as by reducing the
probability of default; and (2) no less costly alternative for loss
avoidance exists." The second condition is perhaps more difficult
to satisfy under current circumstances than has been true in the
past.
164. See Douglas W. Diamond, Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank
Loans and Directly PlacedDebt, 99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 697 (1991).
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Monitoring and reputation may be substitutes, in that creditors
will avoid monitoring costs when borrowers have developed a solid
reputation for repayment." 5 When governments have sufficiently
invested in reputation that the perceived expected loss from default
is less than the costs of monitoring, it is unlikely that creditors will
engage in monitoring at all. The development of financial models
and the longer history of repayment for sovereign borrowers during
both good times and bad have allowed markets to distinguish
between more and less reliable debtors and to adjust interest rates
to reflect risk rather than to engage in monitoring. 6 ' At least in the
United States, default risk for governmental debt is remarkably low,
typically below 2 percent when all municipal bonds are included,
and significantly lower when the bonds are issued for general
municipal purposes rather than when issued to provide low interest
finance for a private firm. 6 7 For instance, one study found that
sixteen to twenty-three year cumulative default rates for tax-backed
and traditional revenue bonds were less than 0.25 percent.' 68 Joel
Seligman reports that the default rate on municipal bonds between
1983 and 1988 was 0.7 percent, while the default rate for corporate
debt was 1.1 percent.'6 9 Given these statistics, rational creditors are
likely to forgo costly monitoring.
Next, consider losses, or the risk that municipal creditors face in
the event of default. Creditors are unlikely to monitor if they believe
that default, should it occur, will be cured with little expense or loss
on their part. Municipal defaults, especially in the case of sizeable
cities, are likely to generate external costs that deprive surrounding
areas of easy access to capital or that generate concerns about
residents' access to basic municipal services. 170 As a result, defaults
trigger significant calls for bailouts by more centralized levels of
165. Id. at 690.
166. See TOMZ, supra note 39, at 86-113.
167. See, e.g., Good Jobs First, Municipal Bonds and Defaults, http://www.publicbonds.
org/public-fin/default.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
168. Id.
169. Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street:A ContextualApproach to the Evolving
Structure of FederalSecuritiesRegulation, 93 MICH. L. REv. 649, 699 (1995).
170. See Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with
Lessons from US. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35,42-43 (JonathanRodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland & Jennie Litvak eds.,
2003).
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government. 71 Although those bailouts may require that the
defaulting city suffer reduction of local fiscal autonomy, and hence
more rigorous scrutiny by state agencies,' 72 creditors who anticipate
bailouts in the event of default will rationally fail to monitor predefault.
A variety of legal doctrines also reduce creditor losses in the event
of default and thus dissuade municipal creditors from monitoring.
In some states in the United States, specific constitutional or
statutory provisions protect municipal creditors in the event of
default. Virginia, for instance, provides that any state funds that
would otherwise be appropriated to a local government must be
paid directly to creditors if the locality is in default on its general
obligation bonds.'7 3 Additionally, the New York Constitution famously provides that constitutional tax limitations can be exceeded
in order to pay debts to which a locality's faith and credit has been
pledged. 174 One would anticipate that creditors prefer these bailouts
to the extent that they impose default costs on municipal residents
while simultaneously reducing the need for costly pre-default
scrutiny or requiring creditors to incur the costs associated with
municipal debt adjustment under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
When creditors have found monitoring to be useful, they may
condition their lending on metrics that are easily monitored or that
can serve as low cost proxies for risky activity that would otherwise
171. Notwithstanding the famous "Ford to City: Drop Dead" headline, Congress ultimately
provided a modest debt guarantee that assisted New York City in averting fiscal disaster, and

the state created a municipal assistance authority that provided payments to bondholders.
See id. at 59. Additionally, Congress has provided a federal bailout of Washington, D.C., and
states provided assistance to the cities of Bridgeport, Philadelphia, Camden, and Miami. Id.
at 60-61. But note the absence of bailouts in the Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS) and Orange County. See id. at 59-61; Gerald J. Miller, Debt Management Networks,
53 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 50, 50-51 (1993). Robert Inman reports that the Illinois Constitution of
1870 contained a prohibition on local bailouts by the State. See Inman, supra note 170, at 58
& n.33; Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 442 (1993).
172. For example, New York State maintains quarterly reports on the City of New York,
including such information as the city's financial statements and a review by an independent
accountant. See Municipal Assistance Corporation of the City of New York, http://www.
nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/ocml8935828.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
173. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2659 (2000).
174. See Flushing Natl Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp. of N.Y., 358 N.E.2d 848, 852 (N.Y.
1976) (interpreting N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).
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require costly investigations. 7 ' For instance, when credible information about some government assets can be obtained at low cost,
creditors may restrict the use of their loans to the purchase of those
relatively transparent assets. 7 6 When that is the case, the interests
of creditors in ensuring that the funded asset generates sufficient
revenue to support debt service is less likely to coincide perfectly
with the general interest of constituents in the overall financial
security of the state. In effect, creditors in such a case provide
comfort to constituents that is parallel to the comfort that creditors
of firms provide to shareholders when the creditors take security
interests in specific assets of the firm rather than a wraparound
1 77
security interest in all the firm's assets.
Alternatively, creditors may eschew examination of the underlying conditions of debt and consider only the amount of debt that a
borrower has incurred, presumably on the theory that sovereigns
will be able to service relatively small debts. Tamim Bayoumi,
Morris Goldstein, and Geoffrey Woglom tested a market discipline
hypothesis for sovereign debt. 7 ' Their conclusions indicated that
yields on debt of states within the United States rise at an
increasing rate with the level of borrowing, and that at some
level of borrowing, the market stops supporting a sovereign's debt
issuance. 79 The result is that borrowers have market incentives to
avoid issuing excessive debt. 8 ° I do not want to make too much of
these conclusions. To conclude that borrowers are attentive to
market constraints is quite different from saying that borrowers'
officials properly respond to market incentives, an issue on which
the authors are agnostic.' 8 ' Moreover, market constraints do not
necessarily indicate that potential creditors are monitoring
borrowers in a manner that compensates for constituent passivity.
175. See Michael D. Bordo, Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, Is GlobalizationToday
Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago? 32-33 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. W7195, 1999).
176. See id. at 32-34.
177. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
178. See Tamim Bayoumi, Morris Goldstein & Geoffrey Woglom, Do Credit Markets
DisciplineSovereign Borrowers?Evidence from U.S. States, 27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
1046, 1046-47 (1995).
179. See id. at 1050.
180. Id. at 1057.
181. See id.
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They may suggest only that creditors review the per capita debt
burden of the issuer, which may be a very rough surrogate for
quality of debt. These studies do, however, suggest that creditors
incentive to obtain information
react at least to some degree to the
1 2
about their sovereign borrowers. 1
Contemporary theories of finance may also reduce incentives to
monitor in other ways. Creditors may be able to manage risk by
diversifying their portfolios rather than by incurring monitoring
costs. Indeed, in a world of securitization, even creditors who wish
to specialize in a particular portfolio of loans, such as sovereign
debt, can diversify by investing in funds that carry multiple loans
rather than by investing in a single loan and monitoring the
borrower."8 3 Although some have blamed securitization for the
absence of monitoring that has allegedly contributed to credit crises,
that literature only suggests that substituting securitization for
monitoring has social costs, not that it is irrational for investors.8 4
The implication of these developments is that even investors who
theoretically have the capacity to enhance democracy by monitoring
for misconduct that constituents are otherwise likely to ignore will
often fail to seize their comparative advantage and confer the
benefits of monitoring on passive constituents. Indeed, the structure
of the transactions may further frustrate any efforts to impress
public creditors into service as monitors. By allowing credit to be
extended against specific assets, debtors dilute the incentives of
creditors who might otherwise monitor broadly, instead causing
to direct their efforts only at specific sources of
these creditors
8 5
repayment.
Consider in this context recent developments in the esoteric area
of state and municipal debt finance. Those of us who play in the
fields of state constitutional law-and who understand that the law
school curriculum does a great disservice by concentrating only on
the musings of a single supreme court when there are fifty state
182. See id.
183. For an example of such a fund, see Invesco PowerShares, PowerShares Emerging
Markets Sovereign Debt Portfolio, June 30, 2008, http://www.invescopowershares.com/pdf/PPCY-PC-I.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
184. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did SecuritizationLead to Lax Screening? Evidence
from Subprime Loans 2001-2006, at 26 (Eur. Fin. Ass'n, meeting paper, 2008), available at
http://faculty.london.edu/vvig/index-files/securitize.pdf.
185. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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constitutions to analyze-sometimes consider the constraints placed
on states and municipalities that seek to incur debt. 8 ' Those
limitations-which typically take the form of election requirements,
flat dollar limitations, or percentages of taxable property-generally
apply only to what is called general obligation debt, that is, debt
secured by all the revenue-generating capacity of the issuer.'8 7 They
therefore do not apply to revenue bonds, that is, debt secured solely
by the revenue produced by a single revenue-producing project, such
as a toll bridge or a municipal water works.' 88 The history of debt
limitations, therefore, is dominated by the efforts of highly paid,
intelligent attorneys and investment bankers to structure transactions to look more like revenue debt not subject to debt limitations
than to general obligation debt.'89
One perhaps unanticipated consequence of this phenomenon has
been to dilute the incentives of creditors to serve as proxies for
constituents because the jurisdiction's revenue sources are balkanized and the creditors' interest is limited to a particular revenue
source rather than to the general fiscal health of the debtor. If bonds
issued to fund street improvements, for example, are secured by
parking meter revenues, bondholders need only monitor meter
collections and disbursements, notwithstanding that they are well
positioned to review a broader array of local fiscal activity." 9
One recent example of this phenomenon is in some respects eerily
reminiscent of fifteenth-century Genoa. The governor of New Jersey,
a former chairman of Goldman Sachs, recently advocated a plan to
reduce outstanding state debt by establishing a nonprofit public
benefit corporation that would collect tolls and manage highways in
the state, 191 a procedure that perhaps qualifies the corporation as
192
the type of "state within a state" that characterized San Giorgio.
As initially proposed, the corporation would issue approximately
186. Gillette, supra note 105, at 370-72.
187. See id. at 367-68.
188. Id. at 368 n.6.
189. Id. at 370-71.
190. Among the other defects of debt limitations, which I will not examine at this time, is
they have potentially antidemocratic effects.
191. STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFIcE OF THE GOVERNOR, FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND

DEBT REDUCTION [hereinafter FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING], available at http://www.state.
nj.us/frdr/pdf/background.pdf.
192. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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$40 billion worth of its own bonds, and use the proceeds both to pay
off existing state debt and to finance the next seventy-five years of
multi-modal transportation projects in the state.'9 3 The corporation's
own bonds would then be paid by substantial toll hikes on the
highways.' The initial plan appears to have met its demise in
massive resistance from legislative leaders who found the projected
800 percent toll increase over fifteen years politically nonviable.'95
Apart from whether the public benefit corporation would share
San Giorgio's right to torture toll evaders on the Garden State
Parkway, this end run around the New Jersey constitutional debt
limitation arguably reduces the democratizing effects of credit.
Although creditors of existing general obligation debt of the state
might monitor for a broad range of fiscal activities, holders of the
corporation's bonds would be limited to a single revenue source-toll
payments-and thus would have little incentive to monitor beyond
those highway payments. To the extent that New Jersey constituents face collective action problems in monitoring their officials,
they would find few reliable proxies in the new set of bondholders
that would arise out of the proposed highway corporation.
IV. THE PLAUSIBLE SCOPE OF CONTEMPORARY CREDITOR
MONITORING

Does the presence of low cost alternatives to monitoring combined
with restricted collateral that reduces the incentives of creditors to
monitor mean that, notwithstanding the theoretical possibility that
creditors could compensate for constituent passivity, they will fail
to serve as democracy-enhancing surrogates? I conclude with a
suggestion that there remains some range within which creditors
can enhance democratic monitoring. Moreover, creditor monitoring
is perhaps most likely, and thus its benefits most plausible, in
those contemporary situations that are strikingly similar to my
historical examples. The successful credit arrangements that arose
in fifteenth-century Genoa, seventeenth-century England, and
eighteenth-century America all responded to and made possible
193.
194.
195.
TIMES,

See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 191, at 12-19.
See id. at 17.
See Richard G. Jones & David Chen, Corzine Weighs Options on Toll Increases, N.Y.
Apr. 30, 2008, at B5.
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demands for commercial expansion and the sharing of political
and economic capital. In those situations, the debtor states may
have been ambitious about the future, but they lacked the reputations, the thick credit markets, or the effective constituent political
cohesion that would have rendered creditor monitoring superfluous.
Instead, these situations cried out for some form of institutional
constraints on the debtor governments, constraints that neither a
small taxpayer base nor a limited electorate could supply. It was in
that kind of environment that small numbers of creditors not only
could, but had to fill the political gap, reduce corruption, and induce
the creation of institutions that would both constitute credible
commitments against default and lay the groundwork for broad
political participation.
The emerging nations of today stand in a similar situation. These
potential debtors necessarily pose greater risks than developed
nations insofar as their success in creating wealth that will support
debt payments remains untested, 196 and they have not generated
reputations that can substitute for more costly monitoring.'9 7
Although the creation of funds pooling multiple emerging nations'
debt allows some diversification that reduces the need for monitoring, many of these funds do not include debt of the least developed
emerging nations. 9 s Rather, nations with limited or no credit
196. See Ruth Bosauer, Note, EmergingMarket InstrumentsPay Siren Song for Pension
Plans,7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 211, 213-14 (1998) (describing several factors that made it
difficult for developing nations to pay their debt).
197. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
198. In reaching this conclusion, I reviewed the top ten holdings of each of the following
emerging market bond funds (ticker symbols are provided in parentheses): AllianceBernstein
High Income A (AGDAX); PIMCO Emerging Markets Bond A (PAEMX); TCW Galileo
Emerging Markets Income I (TGEIX); MFS Emerging Markets Debt A (MEDAX); T. Rowe
Price Emerging Markets Bond (PREMX); Fidelity New Markets Income (FNMIX); MainStay
Global High Income A (MGHAX); Fidelity Advisor Emerging Markets Inc T (FAEMX).
Popular holdings were from Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and
Venezuela. None of the funds listed an African or former Soviet bloc debtor among their top
holdings. The major holdings of an exchange-traded fund that specializes in investments in
the Middle East and Africa-State Street Global Advisors SPDR S&P®Emerging Middle East
& Africa ETF--consist of stocks from Middle Eastern and African countries rather than
bonds. See State Street Global Advisors, SPDR S&P Emerging Middle East & Africa ETF
(GAF), http://www.ssgaftnds.com/etfund/etf_detail-GAF.jsp (last visited Sept. 17,2008). The
Invesco PowerShares Sovereign debt fund mentioned earlier appears to be more diversified,
and includes sovereign debt from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, South Africa, and Vietnam. See
Invesco PowerShares, supra note 183.
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history are likely to obtain capital through individual lenders who
have informational advantages over the broader capital markets
and are thus willing to lend at rates that more closely reflect the
actual risks of payment. For similar reasons, relatively new firms
will seek capital through bank loans rather than through sales of
equity or the debt markets. Thus, lenders may find free riding
implausible and monitoring financially worthwhile, given the
absence of alternatives. Just as banks that make loans to new firms
will want to monitor those firms to reduce moral hazard and to
capitalize on their informational advantage about the firm, so may
individual lenders to developing nations desire to take advantage of
the informational advantage that they have over capital markets
generally.
A potentially happy coincidence that arises from this situation is
that these same nations may be in the greatest need of the kind of
creditor monitoring that can enhance democracy by substituting
for low levels of constituent monitoring. Developing nations, by
definition, are unlikely to have either a broad taxpayer base or
politically cohesive institutions that can represent the financial
interests of all constituents. 199 If the incentive for monitoring arises
out of fear that taxpayers' funds will be misused, the absence of a
significant taxpayer class necessarily undermines constituent
monitoring. 0 0
The essential question is whether creditors who participate in
monitoring do so in a manner that is consistent with the interests
of the constituents of developing nations. Clearly, the creditors of
contemporary emerging nations are not, like the shareholders of
San Giorgio or Dutch citizens, constituents of the debtors.2 1 Thus,
the natural alignment of interests that arises from serving as both
creditor and constituent does not exist in these cases. But given that
199. See generally EDMUND JAN OSMACZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 527 (Anthony Mango ed., 2003).
200. This phenomenon, of course, can reduce constituent monitoring in extremely wealthy
nations as well as extremely poor ones. For instance, renter nations that can fund their

activities from sales of resources, such as oil, do not have to tax their citizens. See Between
Fitna,Fawdaand the Deep Blue Sea, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2008, at 40-41 ("No taxation
without representation, said America's revolutionaries. Arab governments have inverted this
refrain: by appropriating national energy resources and other rents, they neatly absolve
themselves of the need to levy heavy taxes and therefore to win the consent of the governed.").
201. See supra notes 11-12, 142-44 and accompanying text.
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creditors' interests in repayment may require monitoring of the
same conditions that constituents would prefer, the availability of
monitoring may still serve as a proxy for weaker domestic politics.
In short, as democracy comes to the developing world, it is just as
likely to come through the back door of financial monitoring as it is
to come through the front door of political participation. International credit markets provide at least as much opportunity to
generate political reforms today as credit markets provided several
centuries ago.
It is in this context that policymakers should evaluate the
conditions of lending for potential monitors such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or other international
financial institutions (IFIs). Loans made through the World Bank
or the IMF typically are governed by loan documents that contain
specific provisions that exploit the lender's capacity to dictate
repayment terms. 2 As one might expect, these terms tend to
address payment provisions that protect the interest of the creditor
in repayment. °3 There is significant criticism of these institutions,
and of IFIs generally, for imposing Western values on resistant
cultures, for measuring success only by reference to narrow
economic objectives and thus failing to remedy social issues that
have only indirect economic implications, or for sponsoring globalization that adversely disrupts domestic labor markets. 4 Nevertheless, the stated objectives and mandates of IFIs, including the World
Bank and the regional development banks involve not profit
maximization, but rather the promotion of economic or social
development or the reduction of poverty. °5 This is not to say that
the IFIs are indifferent to repayment or that, in practice, efforts to
obtain repayment do not trump the stated objectives. Of course, one
202. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Article IV: Operations,
Feb. 16, 1989, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/
0,,contentMDK20049603-pagePK:43912-menuPK:58863-piPK:36602,00.html.
203. See id. (allowing the Bank, for example, to set the terms and conditions of payments
and to modify the terms of an amortization).
204. See, e.g., INTERHEMISPHERE RESOURCE CENTER & INST. FOR POLY STUDIES, FOREIGN
POLICY IN Focus: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 2 (1996), available at http://
www.fpif.org/pdf/voll/08ififi.pdf.
205. The World Bank, Multilateral Development Banks, http://go.worldbank.org/
F3REECOMB1 (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). The regional development banks are the InterAmerican Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
Asian Development Bank, and the African Development Bank. Id.
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effect of those conditions could be the creation of institutions that,
as a happy byproduct of serving creditor interests, also obligate or
induce debtor governments to enact reforms consistent with
democratizing institutions. Indeed, it would be difficult to claim that
the creation of incentives to subordinate other domestic objectives
to repayment is necessarily at odds with constituent preferences,
because repayment of IFI loans assists in the creation of a reputation that permits
subsequent access to capital markets at low
20 6
interest rates.
But my claims in this Article relate to the possibility that creditor
monitoring can not only enhance democracy directly, but also
indirectly by demanding the creation of institutions or reputations
that, as a happy byproduct of monitoring, create greater consistency
between official conduct and constituent preferences. The conditions
of IFI lending have the possibility of conferring far more specific
benefits than the creation of reputation that will have long-term
benefits to the constituents of borrowers. IFI monitoring is likely to
focus on benchmarks and the creation of institutions that can be
monitored at a relatively low cost. But if those benchmarks and
institutions reflect the objectives for which constituents would lobby
if they were politically cohesive, then creditor monitoring serves as
virtual representation of constituent interests.
The controversial conditions offered by IFIs provide a basis for
determining whether creditors actually play this role. In theory at
least, conditions of lending can improve the quality and effect of aid.
20 7
In practice however, interest group pressures within both the IFI
and recipient countries may significantly distort the effects of aid.20 8
Thus, developing nations may not realize the theoretical benefits of
conditionality that are consistent with the monitoring capabilities
of creditors. Indeed, to some extent, IFIs appear, at least superficially, to be reluctant to seize opportunities to use their monitoring
capacities in ways that might distort decisions that recipient
206. See TOMZ, supra note 39, at 86-88; Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in
Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828, 830-31 (1989).
207. See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Roland
Vaubel, Bureaucracy at the IMF and the World Bank- A Comparison of the Evidence, 19
WORLD ECON. 195, 209 (1996).
208. See Wolfgang Mayer & Alexandros Mourmouras, The Political Economy of IMP
Conditionality:A Common Agency Model, 9 REV. DEV. ECON. 449, 453-56 (2005).
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governments might otherwise render. The World Bank pledges in its
documents not to interfere in the political affairs of members and to
be guided only by economic considerations. °9 Nevertheless, again in
practice, the World Bank has utilized its role as lender to "recommend" structural reforms that seem to transcend financial concerns.
For instance, although a recent report by World Bank staff with
respect to Botswana suggested that authorities implement longterm plans to solve budget deficits, that same report recommended
that avenues toward that goal include HIV/AIDS programs,
deregulation of the labor market, stronger measures to enforce tax
compliance, and trade liberalization.2 1 °
The same possibility seems to be inherent in the recent movement
to reform conditionality to respond to criticisms of external intervention in domestic affairs. The IMF has advertised the requirement of conditionality through a relatively narrow lens that appears
consistent with constituent preferences: "a way for the IMF to
monitor that its loan is being used effectively in resolving the
borrower's economic difficulties, so that the country will be able to
repay promptly."2 1 ' The imposition of these conditions has, at least
on occasion, ignored the preferences of officials in developing
nations, as evidenced by their refusal to accept IMF loans even
during periods of financial distress. Where democratic regimes are
not in place, of course, that refusal does not necessarily mean that
the conditions are inconsistent with the preferences of constituents.21 2 Even in the case of democratic borrowers, it is plausible
that loans that depend on conditions such as those imposed by the
IMF would be refused because meeting the conditions are deemed
too costly.
The World Bank has recently reduced its conditions and taken
steps to make them more consistent with presumed internal
preferences of borrowers, although it has accomplished the latter
209. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, supra note 202, at art.
IV, § 10.
210. See WORLD BANK, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN BOTSWANA 3-5
(2007), availableat http://siteresources.worldbank.orgINTAFRSUMAFTPS/Resources/BWA
_ICA_Volume_1_FINAL.pdf.
211. International Monetary Fund, IMF Conditionality, http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/conditio.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
212. See Silvia Marchesi & Jonathan P. Thomas, !MFConditionalityas a ScreeningDevice,
109 ECON. J. Cll, C114 (1999).
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through reference to standards that are inherently ambiguous, such
as "ownership" of the policy by the borrower and "customization" of
policy.21 But the number of conditions should matter less than their
substance. The key is to create conditions that are both vulnerable
to monitoring and reflective of constituent preferences for which
constituents themselves have limited monitoring capacity. Wolfgang
Mayer and Alexandros Mourmouras, for instance, suggest that
conditions should be tailored to weaken interest groups that frustrate domestic institutional reforms necessary to broader national
welfare.21 4
CONCLUSION

Little of the reasoning provided throughout this Essay would be
lost on the Protectors of San Giorgio. They certainly understood the
relationship between reducing payment risks and reducing political
distortions between officials and constituents. 5 The historical
institutional changes wrought by creditors of developing nations,
motivated largely by self-interest, have similarly sought to induce
political officials to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with
the interests of constituents.1 6
So my claims boil down to the following: creditors have the
capacity to solve some collective action problems that compensate
for defects in monitoring by constituents. Whether or not creditors
have incentives to seize those opportunities depends on the
structure of the debt transaction; the value of creditor monitoring
increases as the probability that constituents will monitor decreases, and all these characteristics converge when credit is being
extended to a jurisdiction in the birth pangs of democracy. If these
claims have any resonance, then the primary implications for
current public debt are to apply greater scrutiny to the transactional
structures used by those who lend to developing nations; to
celebrate their efforts to create institutions of credible commitment;
213. See WORLD BANK, CONDITIONALITY IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY LENDING, at i-iii (2007),
748 9
5
/
availableat http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-111461 84
Conditionalityfinalreportl2O4O7.pdf.
214. See Mayer & Mourmouras, supra note 208, at 463.
215. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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but even more so, to recognize how their self-interested pursuit of
repayment-the conditions that sometimes earn these institutions
substantial scorn-may be as crucial as their financial capital in
contributing to the stability and accountability that historically is
the precursor of both economic and political success.

